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THE PARCEL AS A WHOLE: DEFINING THE
RELEVANT PARCEL IN TEMPORARY REGULATORY
TAKINGS CASES
Laura J. Powell
Abstract: In regulatory takings cases, courts must look at the “parcel as a whole” rather
than individual property interests to determine whether a taking has occurred. The Supreme
Court, however, has not clarified how exactly the relevant parcel should be defined. The
Federal Circuit’s recent decision in CCA Associates v. United States highlights the confusion
surrounding the parcel as a whole. It also highlights the continuing need to clarify how the
relevant parcel should be defined in temporary regulatory takings cases. This Comment
analyzes the parcel as a whole in temporary regulatory takings cases, specifically those
involving lost income. It argues that the relevant parcel should not be measured by the
property’s entire lifetime value, as the Federal Circuit decided in Cienega Gardens v. United
States (Cienega X) and ultimately reaffirmed in CCA Associates. Neither Supreme Court
jurisprudence nor standard economics supports this interpretation of the parcel as a whole.
Instead, this Comment argues that the relevant parcel should be determined by the owner’s
investment in the property in consideration with principles of fairness and justice. This
approach harmonizes Supreme Court jurisprudence and standard economics. It also achieves
uniformity and equitability in temporary regulatory takings cases involving lost income.

INTRODUCTION
The world of the relevant parcel is indeed a wonderland,
where size seems to change in confusing ways. 1
Thirty-six years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided that
courts must look at the “parcel as a whole” rather than individual
property interests 2 when deciding whether a regulatory taking3 has
occurred. The Court, however, did not clarify how exactly the parcel as a

1. Dwight H. Merriam, Rules for the Relevant Parcel, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 353, 415 (2003).
2. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
3. A regulatory taking occurs when the government restricts a private owner’s property use
without any physical invasion. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For example, the
government must provide compensation when a zoning regulation deprives private property of all
economic use. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Although it may be difficult to
see that any property has been “taken” by the government in this situation, the owner has
nevertheless suffered a diminution in his or her property rights. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK,
NONTRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 18 (1977). The property owner is therefore
entitled to just compensation under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST.
amend. V; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127–28 (citing Mahon, 260 U.S. 393).
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whole should be defined. 4 Consequently, courts have struggled to define
the relevant parcel in regulatory takings cases. 5 As one court explained,
“[r]epeated admonitions to use the ‘parcel as whole,’ . . . do little to
define the contours of that whole parcel in any particular case.” 6
A recent case from the Federal Circuit 7 highlights the confusion
surrounding the parcel as a whole. In CCA Associates v. United States,8
apartment building owners sued the federal government under the
Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. 9 The owners argued
that a temporary regulatory taking 10 occurred when two federal housing
acts deprived them of their contractual right to prepay their mortgage
and exit a low-income housing program. 11
Initially, the Court of Federal Claims determined that the relevant
parcel was the owners’ investment in the property. 12 In doing so, the trial
court relied on the Federal Circuit’s parcel as a whole approach in
Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega VIII), 13 a temporary

4. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130–31; see also Keith Woffinden, Comment, The Parcel as a Whole:
A Presumptive Structural Approach for Determining When the Government Has Gone Too Far,
2008 BYU L. REV. 623, 623–24, 629.
5. See, e.g., CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Cienega Gardens v.
United States (Cienega X), 503 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Cienega Gardens v. United States
(Cienega VIII), 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Dunes West Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mt.
Pleasant, 737 S.E.2d 601, 617 (S.C. 2013) (referring to the parcel as a whole as a “Gordian Knot”);
Giovanella v. Conservation Comm’n of Ashland, 857 N.E.2d 451, 456 (Mass. 2006).
6. Giovanella, 857 N.E.2d at 456.
7. The Federal Circuit plays an important role in takings law due to the statutory requirement that
litigants must file their actions in the Court of Federal Claims when seeking more than $10,000
from the federal government. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (establishing concurrent jurisdiction in
Court of Federal Claims for claims not exceeding $10,000); id. § 1491(a) (2006) (establishing Court
of Federal Claims jurisdiction for monetary claims under federal law); see also infra Part III.
8. 667 F.3d 1239.
9. Under the Takings Clause, private property shall not “be taken for public use without just
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Notably, the Takings Clause does not prohibit the taking of
private property. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005). Instead, the Takings
Clause places a condition on the government’s exercise of that power. Id. “In other words, it is
designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.” Id. at 536–37
(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. “A temporary [regulatory] taking occurs when what would otherwise be a permanent
[regulatory] taking is temporally cut short . . . . The essential element of a temporary taking is a
finite start and end to the taking.” Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1097 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
11. CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d at 1243. The issues presented in CCA Associates were not unique. Id.
at 1244. The two federal housing statutes at issue prompted numerous lawsuits from similarly
situated apartment building owners. Id.
12. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 170, 197–98 (2007).
13. 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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regulatory takings case involving the same federal housing acts. 14 Using
Cienega VIII’s approach, the trial court held that a temporary regulatory
taking had occurred. 15
While CCA Associates was pending appeal, the Federal Circuit
changed its parcel as a whole approach in Cienega Gardens v. United
States (Cienega X). 16 In Cienega X, the Federal Circuit determined that
the relevant parcel was actually the property’s entire lifetime value.17
The Federal Circuit’s change in methodology created a considerably
different result in CCA Associates. 18 Using Cienega X’s lifetime value
approach, the Federal Circuit held that no temporary regulatory taking
had occurred in CCA Associates. 19 Although the facts remained the
same, the court changed the relevant parcel—thereby also changing the
case’s outcome. 20
As CCA Associates demonstrates, the parcel as a whole impacts
whether a regulatory taking has occurred.21 If the parcel is defined too
broadly, a taking can be disguised.22 Conversely, if the parcel is defined
too narrowly, a taking can appear to emerge. 23 As a result, the parcel as a
whole plays an important role in regulatory takings cases, 24 particularly
those involving temporary regulations, as in CCA Associates. But
despite the relevant parcel’s importance, significant confusion remains
as to how the parcel should be defined.
This Comment analyzes the parcel as a whole in temporary regulatory
takings cases, specifically those involving lost income. Part I traces the
Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence. Part II examines the
development of the parcel as a whole in the Court’s regulatory takings
jurisprudence. Part III discusses current confusion in the Federal Circuit
regarding how the relevant parcel should be defined in temporary
regulatory takings cases. Finally, Part IV argues that the relevant parcel

14. Id.
15. CCA Assocs., 75 Fed. Cl. at 199.
16. 503 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
17. Id. at 1280–82.
18. 667 F.3d 1239, 1246 (2011).
19. Id. at 1248.
20. Id. at 1246–47.
21. Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States, 707 F.3d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Daniel L.
Siegel, How the History and Purpose of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine Help to Define the Parcel
as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 603, 605 (2012).
22. Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318–19 (1991).
23. Id. at 319.
24. Lost Tree, 707 F.3d at 1292.
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in temporary regulatory takings involving lost income should not be
determined by the property’s entire lifetime value. Neither Supreme
Court jurisprudence nor standard economics supports this interpretation
of the parcel as a whole. Instead, this Comment argues that the relevant
parcel should be determined by the owner’s investment in the property
in consideration with principles of fairness and justice.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT AND REGULATORY TAKINGS:
GUIDING PRINCIPLES, BALANCING TESTS, AND
TEMPORARY TAKINGS

The Supreme Court generally avoids drawing bright-line rules in
regulatory takings cases. 25 Instead, the Court prefers to examine “a
number of factors” rather than use a “mathematically precise” formula.26
Unfortunately, these fact-specific inquiries have created confusion and
inconsistent results in regulatory takings jurisprudence, 27 particularly in
regards to the parcel as a whole. 28 Commentators have repeatedly
criticized the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence for being
“famously incoherent” 29 and “incomprehensible.” 30 Even Supreme
Court Justices have recognized this confusion—Justice Stevens once
explained that “[e]ven the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge
great uncertainty about . . . this Court’s takings jurisprudence.” 31
This Part analyzes the Supreme Court’s “famously incoherent”
regulatory takings jurisprudence. Subpart A summarizes guiding
principles in regulatory takings cases. Subpart B explains the Court’s
three-part regulatory takings test. Finally, Subpart C discusses temporary

25. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012) (“We
have recognized . . . that no magic formula enables a court to judge, in every case, whether a
government interference with property is a taking. . . . [T]he Court has recognized few invariable
rules in this area.”); see also William W. Wade, Penn Central’s Ad Hocery Yields Inconsistent
Takings Decisions, 42 URB. LAW. 549, 550 (2010).
26. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002).
27. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992); see also Gideon Kanner,
Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to
Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307, 309–11 (1998).
28. Wade, supra note 25, at 550.
29. Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (2003).
30. Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law: Considering Inherent Limitations on
Title, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 61 (1996).
31. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In another
dissent that same year, Justice Stevens described regulatory takings cases as more confusing and
standardless than criminal procedure cases. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 340 n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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regulatory takings.
A.

The Supreme Court Is Guided by Principles of Fairness and
Justice in Regulatory Takings Cases

Generally, property ownership includes broad rights to “possess, use
and dispose of it.” 32 The government, however, may impose regulations
that infringe upon private ownership rights. 33 While almost any
government regulation can impact private property rights, not all
government regulations constitute a taking. 34 Most regulatory burdens
must be borne by private property owners “as concomitants of the
advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community.” 35
Moreover, the “[g]overnment hardly could go on” if it was required to
compensate property owners for every regulation that affected private
property. 36 Yet some regulations can be so substantial and unforeseeable
that they constitute a regulatory taking. 37
In order to balance the government’s interests with private property
interests in regulatory takings cases, the Supreme Court relies on
principles of fairness and justice, 38 such as the property owner’s
reasonable expectations. 39 “While scholars have offered various
justifications for [the Takings Clause],” the Court has emphasized its
role in “bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.” 40
Some commentators have criticized the Court’s emphasis on fairness
and justice in regulatory takings cases. These commentators argue that
basing judicial outcomes on notions of fairness and justice is an
32. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
33. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
34. Woffinden, supra note 4, at 636–37.
35. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
36. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
37. Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 14.
38. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
39. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
40. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 14 (“[W]hile most burdens consequent upon government action
undertaken in the public interest must be borne by individual landowners as concomitants of ‘the
advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community,’ some are so substantial and
unforeseeable, and can so easily be identified and redistributed, that ‘justice and fairness’ require
that they be borne by the public as a whole.” (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979))).
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undesirable approach, 41 because “[f]airness, like beauty, is often in the
eye of the beholder.” 42 Despite these critiques, “the Court has long
affirmed that ‘fairness and justice’ is at the heart of the takings
inquiry.” 43 Indeed, recent Supreme Court cases suggest that fairness and
justice is one of the principal considerations in regulatory takings
cases. 44
B.

The Supreme Court Uses a Three-Part Balancing Test in
Regulatory Takings Cases

Until the early twentieth century, only physical takings were
recognized under the Takings Clause. 45 The Supreme Court first
recognized regulatory takings in 1922 in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon. 46 In Mahon, a coal company sold its surface rights to a parcel of
property, but expressly reserved the right to mine coal beneath the
surface. 47 After the sale, the Pennsylvania state legislature enacted a
statute that prohibited any coal mining that would cause homes and
surfaces near residential property to sink. 48 This regulation made it
commercially impracticable for the company to mine coal beneath the
property it had sold. 49 Thus, the regulation had almost the same effect as
if the government had appropriated or destroyed the property. 50
In light of these facts, the Court determined that the regulation
constituted a taking. 51 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes announced:
“[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking.” 52 Justice Holmes, however, did

41. Lise Johnson, Note, After Tahoe-Sierra, One Thing Is Clearer: There Is Still a Fundamental
Lack of Clarity, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 353, 376 (2004).
42. Mark W. Cordes, The Fairness Dimension in Takings Jurisprudence, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 4–5 (2010).
43. Id. at 3.
44. See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 542–43; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 334 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617–18
(2001); Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 35–37
(2008).
45. Woffinden, supra note 4, at 626.
46. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
47. Id. at 412.
48. Id. at 412–13.
49. Id. at 414.
50. Id. at 414–15.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 415.
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not explain how to determine if a regulation has gone “too far.” 53
Almost fifty years after Mahon, the Court developed an “ad hoc,
factual inquir[y]” to determine if a regulation goes “too far” and
constitutes a taking. 54 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, 55 the Court listed three factors that should be weighed in
regulatory takings cases: (1) the regulation’s economic impact on the
property owner; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
the owner’s distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the
character of the government action. 56 In theory, these factors are not
decisive by themselves; 57 each factor must be weighed together, taking
into account all of the relevant circumstances.58 In practice, however, the
regulation’s economic impact largely determines whether a regulatory
taking has occurred. 59
Although there are indications that the Justices saw Penn Central as a
routine decision, 60 it was a judicial landmark in the Court’s regulatory
takings jurisprudence. 61 Recently, however, the Court’s Penn Central
decision has received increasing criticism. 62 Commentators have
attacked Penn Central’s “nebulous test” 63 because it creates confusion
and inconsistent results in regulatory takings cases. 64 In a Harvard Law
53. Id.
54. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
55. 438 U.S. 104.
56. Id. at 124.
57. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 635–36 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
58. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002)
(citing Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
59. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (“[T]he Penn Central inquiry turns
in large part . . . upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact.”).
60. Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Ownership and the Parcel as a Whole,
36 VT. L. REV. 549, 556 (2012); Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century
Retrospective on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 679, 691 (2005); see also Transcript, Looking Back on Penn Central: A Panel Discussion with the
Supreme Court Litigators, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 287, 307–08 (2004) (recollections of
Justice Brennan’s clerk, David Carpenter, who worked on the Penn Central opinion) (“At the time I
thought Justice Brennan was making some modest efforts to bring a little content to an area of law
that was . . . in disarray. . . . [O]ther clerks had told me that the opinion better not say very much
before I started work on the draft and in fact after it was circulated, Justice Stewart’s clerk read it
and said he was pretty sure it doesn’t say anything at all.”).
61. Eagle, supra note 60, at 557.
62. Michael M. Berger, Tahoe-Sierra: Much Ado About-What?, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 295, 310
(2003).
63. Johnson, supra note 41, at 376.
64. Id.; Kanner, supra note 27, at 310; James L. Oakes, “Property Rights” in Constitutional
Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583, 613 (1981).
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Review commentary on regulatory takings, the authors noted that “[t]he
Court has saved the Penn Central edifice, though it is unclear that this
structure is worth preserving.” 65 Nevertheless, Penn Central’s three-part
test remains the Court’s “polestar” in regulatory takings cases. 66
C.

The Supreme Court Recognizes that Temporary Regulatory
Takings Require Just Compensation Under the Takings Clause

Although the Supreme Court recognized that regulatory takings were
compensable under the Takings Clause in Mahon, the Court did not
address temporary regulatory takings until First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles. 67 In 1957, the
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church purchased property in the
Angeles National Forest for a retreat center and recreational area.68 The
church’s property was located next to a watershed, which became a
serious flood hazard after a forest fire in 1977. 69 A year later, the
watershed flooded and destroyed the church’s retreat center.70 In
response to the flooding, Los Angeles County adopted an interim
ordinance that prohibited construction on the church’s property. 71
Shortly after the interim ordinance was adopted, the church sued the
County, arguing that the ordinance denied it all use of the property. 72
Prior to First English, some courts interpreted the Takings Clause as
not requiring compensation for government regulations imposed for only
temporary amounts of time. 73 The Court rejected this interpretation in
First English, holding that temporary regulatory takings also require
compensation under the Takings Clause. 74 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, “temporary [regulatory] takings
which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different
in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly
65. Leading Cases, Constitutional Law — Takings Clause, 116 HARV. L. REV. 321, 322 (2002);
see also Kanner, supra note 27, at 309 n.8.
66. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Our
polestar instead remains the principles set forth in Penn Central . . . .”).
67. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
68. Id. at 307.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 308.
73. Daniel L. Siegel, The Impact of Tahoe-Sierra on Temporary Regulatory Takings Law, 23
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 273, 273–74 (2005).
74. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
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requires compensation.” 75 The Court, however, did not decide whether a
temporary regulatory taking actually occurred in First English. 76 Instead,
the Court remanded the case for a determination of whether a taking
occurred under Penn Central’s three-part test. 77
II.

THE PARCEL AS A WHOLE PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE
IN REGULATORY TAKINGS CASES

The parcel as a whole is an important factor in determining whether a
regulatory taking has occurred under Penn Central’s three-part test. 78
The relevant parcel impacts the severity of a regulation’s economic
impact 79—the factor that largely determines whether a regulatory taking
has occurred. 80 For example, the larger the relevant parcel, the smaller
the regulation’s economic impact will be on the property. 81 In this
scenario, it is less likely a court will find a taking has occurred. 82 In
contrast, the smaller the parcel, the greater the regulation’s economic
impact will be on the property. 83 In this scenario, it is more likely a court
will find a taking has occurred. 84 Despite the importance of the parcel as
a whole in regulatory takings cases, the Court has not clarified how
exactly the parcel as a whole should be defined. 85
This Part examines the parcel as a whole in greater detail. Subpart A
traces the development of the parcel as a whole in the Supreme Court’s
regulatory takings jurisprudence, while Subparts B and C discuss the
Court’s somewhat unsettled relationship with the parcel as a whole.

75. Id. at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. at 322.
77. Id. On remand, the California Court of Appeal held that no temporary regulatory taking had
occurred. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
78. Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States, 707 F.3d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
79. Id.; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496 (1987).
80. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (“[T]he Penn Central inquiry turns
in large part . . . upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact.”).
81. Woffinden, supra note 4, at 624.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 623–24.
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Courts Must Look at the “Parcel as a Whole” Rather than
Individual Property Interests in Regulatory Takings Cases

In addition to developing a three-part test, the Supreme Court
established the “parcel as a whole” rule in Penn Central. 86 In Penn
Central, New York City’s landmark preservation law prohibited the
owners of Grand Central Terminal from constructing a high-rise on the
top of their building. 87 The owners sued the City, arguing that the City
had taken their air rights in the terminal. 88
The Supreme Court rejected the owners’ argument. 89 The Court
explained:
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding
whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking,
this Court focuses . . . [on] the parcel as a whole. 90
In other words, the Court looks at the entire property interest at stake
rather than individual property interests to determine if a regulatory
taking has occurred. 91
After establishing the parcel as a whole rule, the Court focused on the
entire terminal rather than only the air rights above the terminal. 92 The
Court decided that no taking had occurred, because the owners’ property
interests—including their railroad franchise, ownership of the block, and
subsurface rights—retained enough value that the diminution did not
constitute a taking. 93
The Court, however, did not explain how it determined that the
terminal was the relevant parcel in Penn Central. 94 The Court also did
not cite precedent or provide any doctrinal basis for its parcel as whole
rule. 95 Moreover, the Court did not offer any guidance as to how the
relevant parcel should be defined in future cases. 96 As a result, the parcel
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
Id. at 109, 117.
Id. at 119, 130.
Id. at 130–31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Kanner, supra note 27, at 309 n.8.
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130–31; see also Woffinden, supra note 4, at 623–24, 629.
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as a whole rule became a significant source of confusion in later
regulatory takings cases.
B.

The Supreme Court Questioned the Parcel as a Whole in Lucas
and Palazzolo

Although the Supreme Court has relied on the parcel as a whole rule
since Penn Central, the Court has periodically hinted that it might want
to revisit it. 97 For example, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 98 the Court noted that “the [parcel as a whole] does not make
clear the ‘property interest’ against which the loss of [economic] value is
to be measured.” 99 While the Court recognized that this uncertainty has
produced inconsistent holdings in the Court’s jurisprudence, 100 it
declined to clarify how to define the relevant parcel.101
Similarly, the Court referenced the “difficult, persisting question of
what is the proper [parcel]” in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 102 But even
though the Court expressed “discomfort with the logic of [the parcel as a
whole],” the Court again did not provide any clarification as to how the
relevant parcel should be defined. 103
C.

The Supreme Court Reaffirmed the Parcel as a Whole in TahoeSierra

Less than a year after questioning the parcel as a whole rule in Lucas
and Palazzolo, the Court embraced it in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 104 In Tahoe-Sierra, a
regional planning agency imposed various ordinances that restricted
97. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
98. 505 U.S. 1003.
99. Id. at 1016 n.7.
100. Id. Compare Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that a law prohibiting
subsurface coal mining was a taking), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470 (1987) (holding that a nearly identical law was not a taking). Although the Court
distinguished Keystone from Mahon on two grounds, some courts and commentators consider the
two decisions to be inconsistent. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (referring to the two
decisions as “inconsistent”); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 S. CT.
REV. 1, 4–5 (arguing that Keystone gutted, but did not explicitly overrule, Mahon).
101. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (“[W]e avoid this difficulty in the present case, since . . . [the
state regulation] left each of Lucas’s beachfront lots without economic value.”).
102. 533 U.S. at 631.
103. Id. (“[W]e will not explore the point here. Petitioner did not press the [parcel as a whole
issue] in the state courts, and the issue was not presented in the petition for certiorari.”).
104. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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development in the Lake Tahoe region. 105 These moratoria lasted for
thirty-two months. 106 Landowners brought suit against the agency,
arguing that the moratoria constituted a categorical taking 107 of their
property under Lucas. 108 Notably, the landowners did not argue that a
temporary regulatory taking had occurred under Penn Central’s
balancing test. 109
The Court rejected the landowners’ argument that a categorical taking
under Lucas had occurred in Tahoe-Sierra. 110 According to the Court, “a
fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary
prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as
soon as the prohibition is lifted.” 111 The Court therefore held that the
moratoria did not constitute a categorical taking. 112
Although the Court’s holding in Tahoe-Sierra was narrow, 113 the
majority opinion contained dicta regarding temporary regulatory takings
and the parcel as a whole. 114 For example, the Court reiterated that
courts must look at the parcel as a whole when analyzing the economic
impact of a regulation. 115 The Court also stated that “[a]n interest in real
property is defined by . . . the term of years that describes the temporal
aspect of the owner’s interest.” 116 The Court, however, observed that the
temporary nature of a land-use restriction does not necessarily preclude a
finding that a taking has occurred under Penn Central. 117 As the Court

105. Id. at 306.
106. Id.
107. In Lucas, the Court held that a categorical taking occurs when a government regulation
denies “all economically beneficial” use of private property. 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). The Lucas
decision is an exception to the Penn Central balancing test. Id. Aside from situations involving a
Lucas categorical taking, “regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set forth in
Penn Central.” Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005).
108. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 320–21. The district court held that there was no taking under a
Penn Central analysis. Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 34 F.
Supp. 2d 1226, 1240 (D. Nev. 1999). The landowners did not challenge the district court’s Penn
Central findings or conclusions on subsequent appeals. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 317–18.
109. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 317–18.
110. Id. at 332.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 307; see also Berger, supra note 62, at 308.
114. David L. Callies & Calvert G. Chipchase, Moratoria and Musings on Regulatory Takings:
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 279,
281, 291 (2003).
115. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331.
116. Id. at 331–32.
117. Id. at 337.
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explained, “we simply recognize that it should not be given exclusive
significance one way or the other.” 118 Finally, the Court reaffirmed the
role of fairness and justice in regulatory takings cases. 119
Meanwhile, Justice Thomas—joined by Justice Scalia—objected to
the majority’s reliance on the “questionable” parcel as a whole rule in
his dissenting opinion. 120 Citing to Lucas and Palazzolo, Justice Thomas
described the majority’s decision to embrace the parcel as a whole rule
as “puzzling.” 121
III. AFTER TAHOE-SIERRA, THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS
STRUGGLED TO DEFINE THE RELEVANT PARCEL IN
TEMPORARY REGULATORY TAKINGS CASES
The Federal Circuit plays an important role in takings law due to the
statutory requirement that litigants must file their actions in the Court of
Federal Claims when seeking more than $10,000 from the federal
government. 122 As a result, many decisions regarding temporary
regulatory takings and the parcel as a whole can be found in the Federal
Circuit. 123 This Part discusses current confusion in the Federal Circuit
regarding how the relevant parcel should be defined in temporary
regulatory takings cases involving lost income.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Tahoe-Sierra, the Federal
Circuit has struggled tremendously to define the relevant parcel in
temporary regulatory takings cases. 124 For example, in CCA Associates,
apartment building owners argued that a temporary regulatory taking
occurred when two federal housing acts deprived them of their
contractual right to prepay their mortgage and exit a low-income housing
program. 125 In contrast to the landowners in Tahoe-Sierra, the apartment

118. Id.
119. Id. at 334 (“[T]he ultimate constitutional question is whether the concepts of ‘fairness and
justice’ that underlie the Takings Clause will be better served by one of these categorical rules or by
a Penn Central inquiry into all of the relevant circumstances in particular cases.”).
120. Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
121. Id. n.*.
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (establishing concurrent jurisdiction in Court of Federal Claims
for claims not exceeding $10,000); id. § 1491(a) (2006) (establishing United States Court of Federal
Claims jurisdiction for monetary claims under federal law).
123. Siegel, supra note 21, at 611.
124. See, e.g., CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d 1239, 1244, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Cienega X, 503 F.3d 1266, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Cienega VIII, 331 F.3d 1319, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
125. 667 F.3d at 1243–44.
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owners in CCA Associates argued for recovery under Penn Central’s
balancing test rather than Lucas’ categorical exception. 126 As a result,
Tahoe-Sierra did not provide any guidance as to how the relevant parcel
should have be determined in CCA Associates. 127
Initially, the Court of Federal Claims determined that the owners’
investment in the property 128—meaning the owners’ invested
capital 129—was the relevant parcel. 130 In doing so, the trial court relied
on the Federal Circuit’s parcel as a whole approach in Cienega VIII, 131 a
temporary regulatory takings case involving the same two federal
housing acts. 132 Using Cienega VIII’s approach, the trial court
determined that there was an 81.25% economic impact on the property
in CCA Associates. 133 The court therefore held that a temporary
regulatory taking had occurred. 134
While CCA Associates was pending appeal, the Federal Circuit
reversed its Cienega VIII decision in Cienega X. 135 In Cienega X, the
Federal Circuit determined that the property’s entire lifetime value 136
was the relevant parcel. 137 The Federal Circuit changed its relevant
parcel approach as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in TahoeSierra. 138 According to the Cienega X court, Tahoe-Sierra “explicitly
confirmed” that the property’s entire lifetime value was the relevant
parcel in temporary regulatory takings cases. 139
The Federal Circuit’s change in approach created a considerably

126. Id. at 1244.
127. William W. Wade, Federal Circuit’s Economic Failings Undo the Penn Central Test, [2010]
40 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,914, 10,920.
128. The Federal Circuit often uses “owner’s equity” to refer to the owner’s investment in the
property. See, e.g., CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d 1239. This Comment uses “owner’s investment”
throughout for consistency.
129. Wade, supra note 127, at 10,921.
130. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 170, 197 (2007). In CCA Associates, the building
owners’ investment in the property was $811,700 at the time of the temporary taking. Id. at 198.
131. Id. at 195–96.
132. 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
133. CCA Assocs., 75 Fed. Cl. at 198.
134. Id. at 198.
135. 503 F.3d 1266, 1280–82 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d
1239, 1246 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
136. In CCA Associates, the Federal Circuit determined that the entire lifetime value of the
property was the remainder of the mortgage, which is generally twenty years. 667 F.3d at 1246–47.
137. Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1280–82.
138. Id. at 1280–81; see also CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d at 1246 n.3.
139. Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1281.
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different result in CCA Associates. 140 Using this new “lifetime value”
approach, the Federal Circuit determined that there was only an 18%
economic impact on the property in CCA Associates. 141 By changing the
relevant parcel, the economic impact went from 81.25% to only 18%. 142
Although the apartment owners lost over $700,000 of net income as a
result of the two government regulations, the court determined that an
economic impact of 18% was not substantial enough 143 to support a
taking. 144
Notably, the Federal Circuit expressed discomfort with its new parcel
as a whole approach in CCA Associates. 145 The court explained: “If this
methodology were to apply beyond [this case], for example to temporary
regulatory restrictions on fee simples, then all income earned over the
entire remaining useful life of the real property would be the [relevant
parcel]. This would virtually eliminate all [temporary] regulatory
takings.” 146 Bound by Cienega X, 147 however, the CCA Associates court
ultimately employed the lifetime value concept resulting in an 18%
economic impact 148 and held that no temporary regulatory taking had
occurred. 149
IV. DETERMINING THE RELEVANT PARCEL IN TEMPORARY
REGULATORY TAKINGS CASES
The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in CCA Associates highlights
the confusion surrounding the parcel as a whole. It also highlights the
continuing need to clarify how the relevant parcel should be defined in
140. 667 F.3d at 1246.
141. Id. at 1244.
142. Id. at 1246.
143. While there is no per se rule to determine what economic impact will be substantial enough
to support a taking, the economic impact “must be more than a mere diminution.” Id. (citing
Cienega VIII, 331 F.3d 1319, 1343 (Fed. Cl. 2003)). It is extremely unlikely that an economic
impact of less than 50% will support a taking. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1247 (“In Cienega X, we deviated from the traditional lost rent or return on equity
approach, and instead required that the lost income be compared to all of the money the property
would earn over its remaining life.”); see also Cienega X, 503 F.3d 1266, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“The creative theories propounded by my colleagues for redetermining
whether a taking occurred ignore the law of this case . . . .”).
146. CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d at 1247.
147. In the Federal Circuit, “[p]anels are bound by the law of prior panels.” Id. at 1244; see also
Hometown Fin., Inc. v. United States, 409 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
148. CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d at 1247.
149. Id. at 1242.
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temporary regulatory takings cases. Unfortunately, clarification
regarding the relevant parcel does not appear to be forthcoming; the
Supreme Court has denied several relevant petitions for certiorari in
recent years, including one in CCA Associates. 150
This Part proposes a framework for defining the relevant parcel in
temporary takings cases involving lost income. Subpart A argues that the
relevant parcel should not be determined by the property’s entire lifetime
value. Subpart B then suggests that the relevant parcel should be
determined by the owner’s investment in the property in consideration
with principles of fairness and justice.
A.

Courts Should Not Use the Property’s Entire Lifetime Value to
Determine the Relevant Parcel

The relevant parcel should be not be determined by the property’s
entire lifetime value in temporary regulatory takings cases involving lost
income. Neither Supreme Court jurisprudence nor standard economics
supports this interpretation of the parcel as a whole.
1.

Supreme Court Jurisprudence Does Not Support the Lifetime Value
Concept

First, Tahoe-Sierra does not support the Federal Circuit’s lifetime
value concept. Although the Federal Circuit relied on Tahoe-Sierra
when it determined that the property’s entire lifetime value should be the
relevant parcel in Cienega X 151—a decision that the Federal Circuit
ultimately reaffirmed in CCA Associates 152—such reliance is misplaced.
Tahoe-Sierra concerned a categorical taking of property under Lucas.153
The landowners in Tahoe-Sierra did not argue for recovery under Penn
Central’s balancing test, 154 as the apartment owners did in CCA
150. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, CCA Assocs. v. United States, __U.S.__, 133 S.
Ct. 422 (2012) (No. 11-1352), 2012 WL 1636907; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Rose Acre
Farms, Inc. v. United States, __U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1501 (2010) (No. 09-342), 2009 WL 3006231;
see also Johnson, supra note 41, at 378.
151. 503 F.3d 1266, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“In Tahoe-Sierra, the necessity of considering of the
overall value of the property was explicitly confirmed in the temporary regulatory takings
context. . . . Thus we conclude that in a temporary regulatory takings analysis context the impact on
the value of the property as a whole is an important consideration . . . .”); see also CCA Assocs., 667
F.3d at 1246 n.3 (“Cienega X bases this ‘life of property’ requirement on the Supreme Court
decision in Tahoe-Sierra.” (citations omitted)).
152. 667 F.3d at 1247.
153. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 317–18
(2002).
154. Id.
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Associates. 155
As a result of this posture, the Supreme Court analyzed the relevant
parcel in Tahoe-Sierra under Lucas’ categorical exception rather than
Penn Central’s balancing test. 156 Under Lucas, the Tahoe-Sierra Court
determined that “[a]n interest in real property is defined by . . . the term
of years that describes the temporal aspect of the owner’s interest.” 157
The Court clarified, however, that “[a]nything less than a ‘complete
elimination of value,’ or a ‘total loss’ . . . would require the kind of
analysis applied in Penn Central.” 158 Thus, Tahoe-Sierra does not
provide any guidance as to how the relevant parcel should be determined
under Penn Central’s balancing test. 159
Further, Tahoe-Sierra concerned lost property use rather than lost
income. 160 The landowners in Tahoe-Sierra argued that they had been
denied “all viable economic use” of their property. 161 Lost income was
not at issue in Tahoe-Sierra, 162 as it was in CCA Associates. 163 As a
result, Tahoe-Sierra’s relevant parcel determination does not account for
lost income during the temporary regulation. 164 Tahoe-Sierra should not
be read to provide any guidance as to how the parcel as a whole should
be determined in cases involving lost income. 165 Ultimately, the Federal
Circuit erroneously relied on Tahoe-Sierra for its lifetime value concept.
First English also does not support the Federal Circuit’s lifetime
value concept. In First English, the Supreme Court held that temporary
regulatory takings are compensable under the Takings Clause. 166 Under
the lifetime value concept, however, the relevant parcel is defined as “all
income earned over the entire remaining useful life of the real
property.” 167 Income losses during the temporary regulation must
therefore be greater than any subsequent income returns after the

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

667 F.3d at 1244.
535 U.S. at 330–32.
Id. at 331–32.
Id. at 330 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019–20 n.8 (1992)).
Wade, supra note 127, at 10,920.
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 320; Wade, supra note 127, at 10,920.
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 320.
Id.; Wade, supra note 127, at 10,920.
667 F.3d 1239, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Wade, supra note 127, at 10,920.
Id.
482 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1987).
CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d at 1247.
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temporary regulation in order to constitute a temporary taking. 168 Given
land’s infinite life, no temporary regulation will ever cause a loss
substantial enough to constitute a taking. 169 In effect, the Federal
Circuit’s lifetime value concept would “virtually eliminate all
[temporary] regulatory takings.” 170
Finally, a temporary taking is defined as a taking with a finite start
and end. 171 Temporary regulatory takings inherently supply a “temporal
framework under which the underlying takings claim is to be
analyzed.” 172 The period of the temporary taking is therefore the relevant
period for assessing the regulation’s economic impact.173 It is illogical to
ignore the limited duration of a temporary taking and define the relevant
parcel by a timeframe that extends beyond the end of the temporary
regulation at issue. 174
2.

Standard Economics Does Not Support the Lifetime Value Concept

Standard economics also does not support the Federal Circuit’s
lifetime value concept. Temporary regulatory takings that involve lost
income—as in CCA Associates—are fundamentally different from those
that involve lost property—as in Tahoe-Sierra. 175 For example, a
temporary taking of a bar of gold has different consequences than a
temporary taking of an income-producing apartment building. 176 The
owner of the gold bar receives the same property at the end of the
temporary taking, 177 while the owner of the apartment building forever
loses income for the duration of the taking. 178 Returning the use of
property after a temporary taking does not return the income that was
lost during the temporary taking; 179 “the income-generating opportunity
168. Wade, supra note 127, at 10,920.
169. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, CCA Assocs. v. United States, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct.
422 (2012) (No. 11-1352), 2012 WL 1636907, at *21.
170. CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d at 1247.
171. Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1097 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
172. J. David Breemer, Temporary Insanity: The Long Tale of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council
and its Quiet Ending in the United States Supreme Court, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 47 (2002).
173. Seiber v. United States, 364 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he period of the alleged
temporary taking . . . is the relevant period for purposes of assessing the economic impact.”).
174. William W. Wade, Temporary Takings, Tahoe-Sierra, and the Denominator Problem,
[2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,189, 10,199–200.
175. Id. at 10,200.
176. Independence Park Apts. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 692, 707 n.12 (2004).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Wade, supra note 174, at 10,200.
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the property provided [is] entirely lost during the period of the
temporary taking.” 180 At the end of the temporary taking, the owner of
the gold bar is essentially made whole, whereas the owner of the
apartment building is not.
Given this difference, the relevant parcel in temporary takings cases
involving lost income should not be treated the same as the relevant
parcel in cases involving lost property. The standard method to evaluate
the economic impact of lost income is to compare the lost income to the
owner’s investment in the property at the time of the loss. 181
Accordingly, the relevant parcel should be determined by the owners’
investment in the property. 182 As one economist explained, “this is
black-letter economics.” 183
B.

Courts Should Use the Owner’s Investment in the Property in
Consideration with Principles of Fairness and Justice to
Determine the Relevant Parcel

In temporary regulatory takings cases involving lost income, the
relevant parcel should be determined by the owner’s investment in the
property in consideration with principles of fairness and justice. This
approach harmonizes standard economics and Supreme Court
jurisprudence. It also achieves uniformity and equitability in temporary
regulatory takings cases involving lost income.
As discussed above, standard economics requires that the relevant
parcel be determined by the owner’s investment in the property, 184
meaning the owner’s invested capital.185 For example, in CCA
Associates the building owners’ investment in the property was
$811,700 at the time of the temporary taking. 186 Thus, the relevant parcel
would be $811,700. 187 This number should have been compared with the
building owners’ lost income during the Federal Circuit’s economic
impact analysis 188—the first factor in the Penn Central’s three-part
180. Independence Park, 61 Fed. Cl. at 707.
181. Wade, supra note 174, at 10,196; see also Wade, supra note 127, at 10,916.
182. Wade, supra note 127, at 10,921; see also CCA Assocs. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 170,
195 (2007).
183. Wade, supra note 174, at 10,199.
184. See Wade, supra note 127, at 10,921; supra Part IV.A.
185. Wade, supra note 127, at 10,921.
186. CCA Assocs., 75 Fed. Cl. at 198; Wade, supra note 127, at 10,916.
187. Wade, supra note 127, at 10,916.
188. Id.; Wade, supra note 174, at 10,189. The economic impact analysis is outside the scope of
this Comment.
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test. 189
However, the relevant parcel analysis should not end with the owner’s
investment in the property. Regulatory takings cases are ultimately
concerned with fairness and justice. 190 In addition to the owner’s
investment, courts should also consider principles of fairness and justice,
such as the owner’s reasonable expectations 191 and the regulation’s
equitable impact. 192 Incorporating principles of fairness and justice into
the relevant parcel determination would create a “standard of review”193
that achieves both uniformity and equitability in temporary regulatory
takings cases.
1.

Courts Should Consider the Property Owner’s Reasonable
Expectations

When determining the relevant parcel, courts should consider the
property owner’s reasonable expectations. 194 In several cases, the
Supreme Court has hinted that the owner’s reasonable expectations may
impact the relevant parcel. 195 The Court speculated in Lucas that the
answer to the parcel as a whole problem “may lie in how the owner’s
reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State’s law of
property.” 196 The Lucas Court further suggested that the degree to which
the law recognized and protected the particular property interest at stake
may be relevant. 197 Similarly, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis, 198 the Supreme Court noted that the relevant parcel should
be viewed in the context of the owner’s reasonable operations and
financial-backed expectations. 199
189. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
190. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 333–34, 342 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Cordes, supra note 42, at 3.
191. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
192. Jeffrey M. Gaba, Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously: Distributive Justice and the
Takings Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569, 585–86 (2007); James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy,
Weighing the Need to Establish Regulatory Takings Doctrine to Justify Takings Standards of
Review and Principles, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 315, 349 (2010).
193. Holloway & Guy, supra note 192, at 349.
194. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 499 (1987); Woffinden, supra note 4, at 641–42.
195. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 499.
196. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
197. Id.
198. 480 U.S. 470.
199. Id. at 499.

12 - Powell Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014]

DEFINING THE RELEVANT PARCEL

3/26/2014 2:51 PM

171

The Federal Circuit has examined the owner’s expectations when
deciding what constitutes the relevant parcel. 200 For example, in Forest
Properties, Inc. v. United States, 201 the Federal Circuit held that the
district court correctly “[f]ocus[ed] on how the [owner’s] economic
expectations . . . have shaped the owner’s actual and projected use of the
property” when it determined the relevant parcel. 202
Ultimately, focusing on the owner’s reasonable expectations
“reflect[s] a concern with the fairness of imposing costs on a landowner
who has reasonably relied on a state of law.” 203 While regulatory
changes are part of the risk that property owners take when they invest
in property, 204 unanticipated changes in the permissible uses of property
may be unfair to private property owners. 205 Unanticipated regulatory
changes may be particularly unfair when the property owner
substantially relied on earlier rules. 206 Courts should therefore look at the
property owner’s reliance on previous law when determining the
relevant parcel. 207
2.

Courts Should Consider the Regulation’s Equitable Impact on the
Property Owner

In addition to the property owner’s reasonable expectations, courts
should also consider the regulation’s equitable impact on the property
owner. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that regulatory
takings cases should focus on the regulation’s equitable impact on the
property owner. 208 In Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 209
200. See, e.g., Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Appolo Fuels, Inc.
v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177
F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
201. 177 F.3d 1360.
202. Id. at 1365 (quoting Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 56, 73 (1997)).
203. Gaba, supra note 192, at 589.
204. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (“[T]he property owner
necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures
newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers . . . .”); Frank I. Michelman, A
Skeptical View of “Property Rights” Legislation, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 409, 415 (1995)
(“[R]egulation [is] an ordinary part of background risk and opportunity, against which we all take
our chances . . . as investors in property.”).
205. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); DAVID A. DANA &
THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 169–71 (2002); Cordes, supra note 42, at 34.
206. Cordes, supra note 42, at 34.
207. Id. at 35.
208. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80
U.S. 166, 177–78 (1871).
209. 467 U.S. 1.

12 - Powell Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/26/2014 2:51 PM

172

[Vol. 89:151

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

the Court explained that while most regulatory burdens must be borne
“as concomitants of the advantage of living and doing business in a
civilized community,” some regulatory burdens may be so substantial
that “they [must] be borne by the public as a whole.” 210 The Court also
stated in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 211 that regulatory takings cases
should focus on “the magnitude or character of the burden a particular
regulation imposes upon private property rights.” 212
Lower courts—particularly in the Federal Circuit—are increasingly
considering the regulation’s equitable impact in regulatory takings
cases. 213 For example, in Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega
IX), 214 the Court of Federal Claims emphasized that the regulation at
issue imposed disproportionate burdens on only a few property
owners. 215 The Cienega IX court ultimately determined that a temporary
regulatory taking had occurred. 216 Conversely, in Brace v. United
States, 217 the Court of Federal Claims held that a regulatory taking had
not occurred, because the regulation at issue was “generally applicable
to all similarly situated property owners and can in no way be viewed as
being directed at [the] plaintiffs.” 218
Focusing on the regulation’s equitable impact on the property owner
during the relevant parcel analysis addresses questions of equality and
proportionality. 219 In other words, it ensures that some property owners
are not forced to bear public burdens that should be borne by the public
as a whole. 220 Courts should therefore weigh the regulatory benefits and
burdens on the property owner when determining the relevant parcel. 221

210. Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. 544 U.S. 528.
212. Id. at 542 (emphasis in original omitted).
213. See, e.g., Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 356 (2006); Cienega Gardens v. United
States (Cienega IX), 67 Fed. Cl. 434, 467 (2005); Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo,
705 N.W.2d 850, 858 (N.D. 2005); see also Davidson, supra note 44, at 36–37.
214. 67 Fed. Cl. 434.
215. Id. at 467 (“Congress’s decision to enact the [federal housing] statutes targeting specific
property owners of low-income housing who had rights to prepay and exit the program, and not all
owners of rental properties or all taxpayers, raises a concern under the Takings Clause . . . .”).
216. Id. at 479.
217. 72 Fed. Cl. 337.
218. Id. at 356.
219. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001); Davidson, supra note 44, at 36.
220. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
221. Gaba, supra note 192, at 585.

12 - Powell Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014]

DEFINING THE RELEVANT PARCEL

3/26/2014 2:51 PM

173

CONCLUSION
Despite its importance in regulatory takings cases, it is unclear how
the parcel as a whole should be defined. The Federal Circuit’s recent
decision in CCA Associates highlights the confusion surrounding the
parcel as a whole. It also highlights the continuing need to clarify how
the relevant parcel should be determined in temporary regulatory takings
cases involving lost income. This Comment argues that the relevant
parcel in temporary regulatory takings cases involving lost income
should not be determined by the property’s entire lifetime value. Neither
Supreme Court jurisprudence nor standard economics supports this
interpretation of the parcel as a whole. Instead, the relevant parcel
should be determined by the owner’s investment in the property in
consideration with fairness and justice. This approach harmonizes
standard economics and Supreme Court jurisprudence. It also achieves
uniformity and equitability in temporary regulatory takings cases
involving lost income.

